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Allow me, first, to express my pleasure and appreciation for the invitation to 
participate in this Roundtable organized in the context of the First International 
Sitgas Conference and for the opportunity to address such a distinguished 
audience. I was asked to present a producer's view on the impact on the 
Mediterranean of the fundamental changes which are taking place in the 
European gas market but I hope that the views I am about to express will reflect 
a fair balance between the interests of the various participants in the business. 
Let me make it clear that, by producers, I mean the gas exporting countries as 
well as the companies involved in gas export projects and that I am not speaking 
on behalf of either of them.
What I intend to do in this presentation is, first, to recall briefly the 
growing role of natural gas in the world energy scene and in the Mediterranean 
market, in particular, second, to highlight the main factors behind such a growth, 
third, to consider the implications of the proposed changes in the European 
regulatory framework and, finally, to analyse the producers' likely response in 
the light of which I will discuss the need for an orderly transition.
Highlights of the Gas Success Story:
Like many events of this kind, this conference has, no doubt, highlighted the 
growing role of natural gas in the world energy picture. Most of the participants 
in the gas business predict a great future for this premium fuel. Let me 
summarize the consensus view:
• Natural gas has become — and is expected to remain — the fastest 
growing fuel for the foreseeable future.
• The world gas resource base is growing and is clearly sufficient to 
meet the potential long-term demand.
• Gas has become the preferred fuel because of its environmental 
benefits and its economic advantages, particularly in power 
generation.
• Gas provides the ideal bridge towards a sustainable future based on 
renewable energy.
We have, indeed, moved a long way from the situation of the 1970s when, in 
Europe, it was prohibited to use gas in power generation and when, in OPEC 
countries, gas was simply flared in vast quantities. At that time, I was in charge 
of selling Algerian gas and 1 remember complaining about the limited attention 
that this premium fuel was getting outside the US market. In those days, I used 
to say that gas was the "neglected child" of the hydrocarbon family — or oil’s 



























































































brother's growth. A perfect illustration of this state of affairs is the French 
expression "gaz fatal" used for gas associated with crude oil production, a sort of 
"necessary evil" that must be flared and destroyed.
Well, the "little brother" has made a lot of progress since then. He is 
commanding more respect and deserving more attention. Gas has, indeed, grown 
faster than any of the members of the large fossil fuels family and is now 
showing clear signs of a wish for independence to potentially become the main 
energy source of the 21st century.
Consider the following performance, which was achieved in the space of 
one generation, i.e. since the early 1970s.
Table 1 Natural gas : the fastest 
fuel
growing fossil
Early 1970s Late 1990s
World consumption (bcm) 1100 2300
Gas share(%) 18 24
Proven reserves(tcm) 52 1 4 6
Static life time (R/P ratio) 47 6 3
International trade (bcm) 4 6 485
Number of countries involved 13 57
OPEC gas flaring (bcm) 150 50
Source: BP S tatistical R eview s
• World gas consumption doubled while oil consumption increased by 
a quarter only. In fact, gas has largely displaced oil from stationary 
energy markets.
• Gas share, in the world primary energy balance, grew from 18 to 
24% while oil's share fell from 48 to 40%.
• Proven reserves of natural gas increased three-fold while oil 
reserves grew by 50% only. At the end of 1999, their static lifetime 
was sixty-three years compared to forty years in the case of oil.
• International gas trade grew ten-fold while oil trade remained 
virtually constant. The number of countries engaged in cross-border 
gas trade has grown from a dozen in the 1970s to almost sixty 
currently.





























































































Natural gas developments have been spectacular in Europe over the same 
period:
Table 2 Gas growth and a declining resource base
_____________in Europe_______________________________
Early 1970s Late 1990s
OECD Europe Consumption 
(bcm)
145 420
Gas Share (%) 6 22
International Trade (bcm) 15 270
Number of countries involved 8 34
Pipeline trade 4 22
LNG trade 2 5
Pipeline & LNG trades 2 7
Proven reserves (bcm) 5500 4800
Static life time (R/P ratio)
Source: BP Statistical Reviews
38 12
• Western European gas consumption increased almost three-fold.
• Gas share in the primary energy balance grew from 6 to 22%.
• Cross-border trade (to and within Western Europe) grew from 
15 bcm in 1970 to 270 bcm in 1999, with the number of countries 
involved increasing from 8 to 34, including both pipeline and LNG 
trades.
But, unlike what's happening at the world level, the size of the resource base is 
declining with a static life down to twelve years only in 1999 compared to thirty 
eight years in the early 1970s.
Natural gas developments have been even more remarkable in Southern 





























































































Table 3 Gas developments in the
____  ___ Mediterranean
Gas Gas share Gas imports
consumption (bcm) (%) (bcm)
1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000
France 15.1 39.6 8.5 13.7 0.5 42.8
Greece 0 1.7 0 5.0 0 1.9
Italy 14.2 63.8 10.5 34.6 0 57.6
Portugal 0 2.5 0 9.1 2.2
Spain 0.9 16.8 1.0 12.1 0 16.9
Turkey 0 14.1 0 17.1 0 14.0
Total 30.2 138.5 7 24 0.5 135.4
Source: BP Statistical Reviews
• Gas consumption increased almost five-fold.
• Gas share in primary energy grew from 7 to 24%.
• Cross-border trade increased from virtually nothing to 
135 bcm per year and while, thirty years ago, only France 
was importing some LNG from Algeria, all of Europe's 
Mediterranean countries are now involved in both pipeline 
and LNG trades.
THE RATIONALE OF THE TRADITIONAL ORDER
Natural gas has, therefore, achieved in Europe and particularly in the 
Mediterranean area, in relatively short time, an excellent record in terms of 
demand growth, market share and international trade. This success was possible 
because of a number of favourable factors, the most important of which was, 
from a producer's perspective, the existence of a contractual framework built 
over the years between a limited number of sellers and buyers which was 
particularly well-suited for an immature market.
The traditional framework was based on long-term contracts and inter­
fuel pricing in which the seller took the price risk (sometimes with a floor price 
safeguard mechanism and a price review clause) while the buyer took the market 
risk via a "take or pay" obligation. Pricing formulae were agreed on, from time 
to time, to ensure that gas prices remained in harmony with prices of alternative 
fuels in the buyer's market, thus ensuring, at the seller's risk, the buyer's 
competitive position in the market. Such a framework supported large 
investments in production, transmission and distribution facilities and 
contributed a great deal to the expansion of cross-border trade, which enabled 




























































































priced imports. The average European border price for imported gas while 
slightly higher than the average US well-head price was, over the period under 
consideration, about $ 1/mmbtu less than both the average Japan import price — 
or the price of crude oil delivered to the IEA countries.
Chart 1
European gas imports 
have been moderately priced
The contractual framework under which the European gas industry operated so 
successfully for decades was considered a fair arrangement. There were periods 
when the seller was hurt because of low oil prices, as was the case in 1986 and 
again in 1999, and periods when the buyer was hurt, as a result of high oil 
prices, like in the early 1980s and last year, as it could not favourably compete 
in power generation against coal or nuclear generated electricity.
But, to be perfectly candid, it can be said, with the benefit of historical 
perspective, that, while the risks were shared between the buyer and the seller, 
the producer did not receive, on balance, a fair share of the rewards. It is, indeed, 






























































































Gas exports to Europe have not been 
very lucrative for the producers
OIL IMPORTS w GAS IMPORTS*
The resource economics of a long-haul gas project have, indeed, 
historically been relatively poor compared to oil projects. This is due to the fact 
that natural gas is much more expensive to transport than crude oil. As a result, 
the value netted back at the wellhead — or the economic rent available for the 
producer — is much smaller in the case of gas. The producer's rent associated 
with gas exported into Europe is about one-third of the rent available in oil 
exports. The average rent collected by the producer for the period following the 
1986 price crash is about $ 12/bl (or the equivalent of $2/mmbtu) for oil 
compared to less than a dollar per million btu for gas, that is less than the rent 
collected by the consumer's government through taxes and about 10% of the 
burner tip price.
In the early days of the LNG business — during the 1960s and early 1970s 
— Algeria was barely making a modest financial return on Sonatrach's 
investments. The netback achieved for the rest of the 1970s was about 
25 cents/mmbtu on average. As a result of the general increase in energy prices 
of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the well-head value improved and 
exceeded the dollar mark until the 1986 price crash. Since then, it has been less 




























































































price increase. I suspect that the record is not any better for Norwegian and 
Russian exports.
The relative low profitability generated by gas exports is behind the long 
gestation period associated with the launching of long-haul "grass-roots" 
projects, which are capital intensive and require long lead times. This is well 
illustrated by the fact that, in 2000, as much as 80% of world's gas production 
did not leave the country in which it was produced and that, as a result, only 
20% of produced volumes were traded internationally as compared to more than 
50% in the case of oil.
Chart 3
80%  of world’s  gas production 
is used locally
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS
With the proposed changes in the EU regulatory framework, driven by the desire 
to increase the economy's industrial competitiveness, the European gas industry 
is now expected to undergo a fundamental restructuring. The on-going reforms 
seek to achieve several objectives through competition in a single liberalized 
market, with the ultimate aim of reducing gas prices for the benefit of the final 
consumer. The process is likely to lead to a shift in the composition of the gas 




























































































enjoyed by many of the established players and the entry of new players, 
particularly those with secure access to resources.
Market liberalization is obviously a good thing to the extent that, through 
competition, it improves cost efficiency, stimulates technical innovation and 
progress and ensures that suppliers are more responsive to their customers. No 
one could object to that. This process should normally translate into lower gas 
prices at the consumer end and to higher gas demand. The real question is 
whether it will provide the appropriate investment climate for the continued 
expansion of the European gas industry consistent with Europe's concern for 
security of supply and its ambitious goals under the Kyoto Protocol.
The implications of the liberalization drive on contractual relationships 
have, recently, been the subject of an intense debate. The opinions are divided 
between those who expect that the traditional system 1 have described earlier 
will prevail, in a slightly modified form, and coexist with a limited form of the 
Anglo-Saxon model, and those who believe, on the contrary, that the emergence 
of short term and spot market trading will, undoubtedly, have a tidal wave effect 
on the underlying structure of the industry in which long-term "take-or-pay" 
contracts will be, at best, renegotiated and, at worst, abandoned altogether.
But, judging from recent developments and from the experience of the 
countries who have totally liberalized their market, the move is clearly towards 
the Anglo-Saxon model, with market related pricing, shorter-contracts, 
increased volume flexibility leading to volatile prices, decreased supply security, 
loss of confidence in the gas industry and the gradual surrender of all that has 
been achieved in the past.
There is a clear pressure today on the producers to give up the assurances 
of off-take commitment they received in the past in order to create conditions 
for greater competition in the market place. As a result, the producers will be 
asked, not only to take a higher level of price risk, than was heretofore the case, 





























































































The liberalization drive 











The inevitable effect for the gas industry is that the risk associated with export 
projects will be shifted upstream. What will be the producer's likely reaction?
PRODUCERS' RESPONSE
Producer governments are conscious of the fact that, in today's global world 
dominated by a free market economy, they must adapt to changes if they want to 
survive. Most of them are engaged in a radical process of transformation of their 
own to offer a better future for their citizens and are moving away from a simple 
model of direct state management of resource development to a more complex 
model which offers an enhanced role for foreign investment and private capital. 
The producers are adopting a pro-active stance, including:
• The phase-out of State management in resource development;
• An enhanced role for foreign investment and private capital;
• Forward integration downstream;
• New alliances and partnerships;
• The restructuring of the gas value chain;




























































































The ongoing reforms in the Algerian energy sector, for example, pursue the goal 
of increased economic efficiency through liberalization, privatisation and 
competition with the minimum level of regulation required to insure a smooth 
transition from the old centralized state-owned system to the new economic 
order. In the new gas regime now under discussion, private companies (Algerian 
or foreign) are invited to participate in the development of the Algerian gas 
industry on the same terms as Sonatrach which will ultimately be privatised.
They will have the right to freely monetise their gas reserves for local 
consumption or exports at market prices. They have guaranteed access to the 
existing transmission infrastructure at non-discriminatory tariffs and are free to 
build their own LNG or pipeline export facilities. But this does not mean that 
Algeria will be indifferent to the value placed on its gas reserves. This is an 
issue I shall return to in a moment.
The ongoing reforms on both the producer and consumer sides can, 
therefore, open the door for attractive opportunities and for profitable 
partnerships along the gas value chain, with forward integration of the 
producers' downstream, including the power generation sector and the backward 
integration into production of the established mid-stream players.
Such a strategy is already being implemented on a limited scale and will, 
no doubt, be pursued vigorously. Will it succeed in achieving a fair distribution 
of the economic rent between the upstream and downstream sides of the 
business? If it does, so much the better and if gas prices come down at the 
consumers' end as a result of competition, so be it, as long as the producer is 
adequately compensated.
As far as gas indexation is concerned, many analysts expect that, under a 
liberalized market, competition will succeed in decoupling oil and gas prices, 
with the emergence of spot and future markets and gas-to-gas competition. 
Some even argue that the increasing gas-electricity convergence will ultimately 
lead to a situation where the electricity market will progressively serve as the 
main reference for gas trading and prices, with an indexation based on power, 
coal and, perhaps, spot gas prices.
In my view, the indexation of gas prices to oil or other energy or cost- 
based indices is not the most crucial dilemma facing the producers. In reality, 
gas prices have moved in tandem with oil product prices, even in fully traded 
gas markets, driven by interruptible markets that swing between oil and gas, so 
natural gas prices will never be completely independent from oil prices in the 
foreseeable future. To be sure, producers have not always benefited from a rigid 




























































































electricity and/or inflation indices once an acceptable minimum base price has 
been agreed.
The real problem, as I see it, is not price indexation but rather price 
volatility. In this respect, I believe that a departure from the current indexation 
mechanisms in favour of spot gas prices will inevitably result in an extreme 
fluctuation of gas prices as has been the case for oil prices since the 
introduction, in the early 1980s, of the spot and futures markets.
COOPERATION OR CONFRONTATION?
In attempting to adapt to the change with a pro-active stance — i.e. in a climate 
of co-operation rather than confrontation — the producers will need to protect 
their revenues and market share. There is no guarantee, however, that they will 
succeed. The restructuring of the gas value chain of the magnitude required to 
level the playing field, in terms of economic rewards, between the well-head and 
the burner tip, is a slow process. The producers' desire to move downstream may 
be frustrated by their financial constraints. Entry barriers and further EU 
regulations and interference may limit their autonomy and, with no minimum 
price, their exports revenues may collapse as a result of gas-to-gas competition. 
Moreover, the modus operandi they are developing with the former "national 
importers" to avoid disturbances may be challenged by the EU regulators. Under 
these conditions, they may have no choice but resort to a defensive strategy to 
resist the change.
In the case of on-going sales, the producers' ability to resist is relatively 
limited by their economic incentive to keep the existing supply infrastructure 
fully utilized as long as revenues exceed marginal cost. If they cannot secure a 
minimum level of revenues to cover tax paid cost, they may very well decide to 
adopt a co-ordinated stance to regulate supply.
Security of supply, which is a legitimate concern for Europe, goes hand in 
hand with security of off-take for the producer. One is not possible without the 
other. The EU may think that it can destroy the buyers' cartel but it clearly 
cannot unilaterally change the rules of the game without consulting the countries 
who have taken the risk to create a market and who would not be allowed now 
to benefit from that risk. If there is no obligation to "take", then there should be 
no obligation to "deliver", with all the consequences that such a situation could 
entail in terms of irregular deliveries and potential supply interruptions.
In this respect, the Forum of the Gas Exporting Countries, which was 
created in May 2001 in Tehran and which will convene again in January 2002 in 




























































































governments will, in any case, likely adapt their fiscal regime to protect their tax 
base, with a norm or reference price, to avoid the undesirable consequences on 
national spending of volatile commodity prices. They will simply refuse to take 
the risk of subsidizing their gas exports through the tax system.
Chart 5.
The liberalization drive 
will increase the producer’s  risk
•  Em ergence  of spo t  and futures < 1
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In the case of new supply, where a producer would be asked to consider a new 
"grass-roots" project, without a long-term "take-or-pay" contract, the situation is 
more straightforward. It is simply unacceptable. No responsible government or 
company will, in my view, commit to invest billions of dollars in any capital 
intensive and high-risk venture without the assurance that the produced output 
will be regularly lifted. Besides, in view of the gas exporting countries limited 
ability to support large capital investments programs in resource development, 
given their obligation to meet more pressing social needs, the new infrastructure 
required to increase gas exports will have to be financed externally by private 
investors and lending institutions, which are unlikely to commit the huge funds 
required without the guarantee of a "take-or-pay" provision.
THE NEED FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION:
If the proposed changes in the European regulatory framework go forward the 
Anglo-Saxon way, if the industry does not succeed in restructuring the gas value 
chain to level the playing field between the well-head and the burner tip, and if 
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gas will progressively be traded as a commodity and market forc?s will 
determine the level and timing of the investments required to meet the projected 
demand.
The risk of allowing this to happen is to create an environment of 
increased price volatility and an erratic investment climate, with smaller and 
more expensive projects, higher market risk and lower flexibility which may 
result in potential supply shortages and disruptions, as was the case in California 
during the 2000-2001 winter period. While such a risk can be mitigated in the 
short to medium term, in view of the current contractual over-supply and the 
available ample infrastructure capacity, Europe may not be able to secure the 
significant incremental gas supplies which it needs to import in the long term. A 
kind of "false calm” may persist for some time and may disguise hidden 
challenges.
The alternative, for the EU’s regulators, is to recognize that, in view of 
Europe's increasing dependence on long-haul external supplies and its ambitious 
environmental commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, Continental Europe cannot 
afford a radical liberalization "a la UK”.
Because gas has an essential role to play in meeting Europe's security of 
supply and environmental objectives and because it is a fuel which provides an 
ideal bridge towards a sustainable future based on renewable energy and is, 
therefore, of critical importance to the long-term development of the global 
economy, it should not be treated merely as a tradable commodity and only and 
simply as a profitable business opportunity.
It is now widely recognized that the question is no longer whether the 
European gas market will be fully liberalized but when, how and at what pace. 
True, the old model cannot survive if it inhibits competition but, surely, there is 
need for an orderly transition from the traditional contractual framework to a 
modified Anglo-Saxon type model which will recognize the specific political, 
economic and social dimensions of Southern Europe's relations with its gas 
suppliers, which are totally different from those prevailing in the US and the 
UK. Innovative approaches are required for a gradual reallocation of risk and 
rewards which, although not totally in line with the prevailing "competition" and 
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